Thrasymachus and the slave codes 2

Continuing in a hypothetical mode in reading slave codes, thinking about Thrasymachus, and turning to justice questions...

How can justice-is-the-might-of-the-stronger be made intelligible? Especially if you think, as I do, that Socrates is right, and that he is a champion of reason, and he is not an asshole or thinks slaves ought to be subjugated, or anything like that. But you can see Thrasymachus' view as being a heroic defender of the underdog if you regard the slave as a kind of powerful figure. The slave is not the victim of power but the possessor of power. Clearly the slave codes are written to counterbalance the slave's power, after all. You don't fear something unless it has power. And if nothing else, the slave has the power to provoke fear. But the slave also has power to create mischief. A slave revolt is at least that. A kind of terrorizing power. Of course it could be more than that if the slave can set fires and commit murder, all of which certainly happened during uprisings.

So in that sense Thrasymachus' position can be understood more sympathetically. If the power of the stronger is de facto, then in a slave-owning society the owner has it because they control the whereabouts of the slave. The legislator has it---in a way---but that would be de jure; I suppose the same is true of the sheriff. The slave has it because of the nature of the threats they pose.

One can read Thrasymachus as saying that whoever actually has the power ought to retain that power, and that that is how we decide what is just. It's them carrying out the dictates of their power---essentially, whatever their whims are. A tyrannical theory of justice. But you can regard Thrasymachus as endorsing the efforts to unseat power, and thus endorse the power that the weaker have to overthrow the stronger. It sounds contradictory---I guess it is---better to think of the weak force as still being a kind of force, and that in the struggle it becomes strong (or at least stronger) and that would be the fulfillment of justice. We can think of this as a kind of Thrasymachus-ish theory of justice as applied to the Negro slave as endorsing the effort to unseat power and replace it with their own power. If that's a consistent reading we can take Thrasymachus as endorsing slave revolts. And isn't this after all some of the early Hobbes? Maybe Foucault as well. Thrasymachus (and Plato) predate(s) both, of course. 

But if that is what justice demands---the rising up of the weak over the strong so as to become strong? Then I think it's kind of interesting. The chief complaint, though, would be the complaints that Socrates actually has. 

He has two kinds: the first is conceptual, that the concept of justice precludes any concept of de facto strength, let alone the efforts to achieve de facto strength. So the doctor is never acting to make themselves advantaged, but is always acting on behalf of the patient. That after all is the function of a doctor---same thing. 

The other kind of complaint is something like, if you make justice parasitic on de facto strength, then you are (in a sense) limiting justice to what the strong can achieve. (Is this in Book 1? I'm not sure.) So not only are you running afoul of the concept of justice, but you're also shortening justice. So if the slave revolts, and takes over the municipality (?) in which the plantation is located, would we say of that that that is justice? But then you have the problem, that that is only as good as the revolting slaves' ability to hold the fort. In a sense justice would be achieved only to the extent that the slaves could withstand whatever counter-revolt efforts occurred. 

Whereas on the kind of view that Socrates endorsed there would be some sort of appeals process. If justice has been flouted, then there would be an appeal one could make. This is the modern understanding of justice. You can make a case to a higher body and they could rule on the merits, and so on. But justice-as-strength does not account for that. 

But I'm not now sure that Socrates makes anything like this sort of objection in Book 1. It sounds more Kantian actually. But I can't imagine that Socrates does not have something like this in mind. Thrasymachus could respond to this last kind of objection and say that if you understand the legislator as having a kind of strength (as in the strength of a ruler) then the goal of a successful, full uprising by a slave not just to have sufficient guns and firepower to shoot anyone who comes close by the plantation, and thus achieving justice by securing the plantation due to the force of the weapons being used, but it would also be to take over the state house, and becoming a legislator---in a sense, becoming a tyrant. And who is above a tyrant? You can say whatever you like about courts and due process of law and all that, but in a tyrant state, those institutions (and everything else) will serve the tyrant. And so the ultimate justice would be to become the tyrant, rather than being able to bring a case to court. (I remain unsure whether Socrates makes this kind of point.) But if this complaint were made, I imagine Thrasymachus could make the kind of point like I just described. 

Thrasymachus as justice theorist for the slave: once you pose the question this way, then the Socratic line of reasoning becomes kind of irritating. Because what he is doing is he is presenting obstacles to the success of the one you are rooting for. And every modern reader is going to know how the story ends.