Logic as relations of ideas in Hume

Here are some quick screen shots of my notes on relations of ideas. I'll upload proper scans when I get a chance.

Extensions to other times and other objects

A question I raised in an earlier Hume post went as follows:

/>/One of Hume's central doctrines is that we cannot discover causal relations via impressions; that's clearly what his range of examples is supposed to show (bread, billiard balls, etc). But in part 2 of section 4, Hume glosses his doctrine in a slightly different way: "As to past Experience, it can be allowed to give direct and certain information of those precise objects only, and that precise period of time, which fell under its cognizance: but why this experience should be extended to future times, and to other objects...." The problem here seems to be not about causal relations, but about our knowledge of object and other, as well as our knowledge of past and future times. So an intriguing question: is causal information non-discoverable because object-other informationis non-discoverable? Or perhaps because past-future information is non-discoverable? (Which thing can't we know via impression that leads us to miss out on natural patterns?)/->/

Let me see if I can make my central idea a bit clearer. (1) I wonder, given Hume's remark here quoted, why he thinks we cannot tell how to extend the information we have about a particular object to some other object. Similarly, (2) I wonder why he thinks we cannot tell how to extend the information we have for some period of time to some other period of time. 

Questions (1) and (2) seem different to me than the stock Hume doctrine that we cannot have causal information given that we cannot have an impression that corresponds to the necessity that effects follow from causes. The stock doctrine is plainer to accept, it seems, since necessity is logical information, and on the Humean picture logic belongs among relations of ideas rather than matters of fact. But is the this-ness of an object versus the that-ness of some other object logical in that way? Less idiosyncratic: is the individuation of objects logical for Hume? The time version of my worry (in (2)) is similar, if future times are simply regarded as times other than the past or present ones. Is the this-ness (perhaps the now-ness, or the past-ness) of a time versus the that-ness (then-ness) of some other time a logical feature of it?

There's a strong Cartesian reading we could give which would treat pattern-y features of our precepts as logical; but no self-respecting empiricist could possibly go there, I would think. To see things that way would completely hollow out empiricism, since sense information would be little more than a logical edifice built around some kind of raw stimulus. 

Maybe Hume has something in mind about abstract categories of thought that are inaccessible to sense, and that capture some of the features I'm puzzling over. Maybe his treatment of space and time (in the Treatise) would shed more light on this. 

That's where I'll look next.

Hume questions 2

Here are some bloggable questions that occur to me as I read the Enquiry, sections 3-5.

Re section 3:

01 Hume refers to a "universal principle" that led to the appearance of all the diverse languages spoken by various peoples in the section's opening paragraph. He says too little about his idea, but I'm curious what he has in mind here. Is language merely a moving around of relations of ideas, and so the principle in question is a principle of logic and the a priori operations of mind? But then how did it lead to empirical facts about language varieties? Or is language a tool for expressing our impressions to others, and thus is sort of a posteriori, sort of a priori?

Re section 4:

01 A homework assignment that grew from the discussion in the room today: does Hume think of impressions as simple? complex? both? Does it matter to his epistemology to sort impressions using simple/complex criteria?

02 Does agnosticism about causal relations entail any substantive claims about those relations? (That is, are we entitled to conclude anything about the real nature of cause and effect from the fact (if it's a fact) that we cannot discover causal information?)

03 Hume's short list of "ultimate springs and principles" near the end of Part 1 includes "elasticity, gravity, cohesion of parts, communication of motion by impulse". What kind of list is this? Are these old-timey versions of what physicists think of as the Standard Model? Or is it meant to be more of a list of what ordinary observers would marvel at in the realm of physical events that occur in everyday life?

04 One of Hume's central doctrines is that we cannot discover causal relations via impressions; that's clearly what his range of examples is supposed to show (bread, billiard balls, etc). But in part 2, Hume glosses his doctrine in a slightly different way: "As to past Experience, it can be allowed to give direct and certain information of those precise objects only, and that precise period of time, which fell under its cognizance: but why this experience should be extended to future times, and to other objects...." The problem here seems to be not about causal relations, but about our knowledge of object and other, as well as our knowledge of past and future times. So an intriguing question: is causal information non-discoverable because object-other information is non-discoverable? Or perhaps because past-future information is non-discoverable? (Which thing can't we know via impression that leads us to miss out on natural patterns?)

Re section 5:

01 Hume's theory of belief (discussed in part 2) is quite naturalistic: "belief is nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady conception of an object, than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain." So is it possible to have a belief about something as a result of reasoning?

Hume questions 1

I'm teaching a Hume seminar this Summer, hoping to both get to know Hume better and to help a small number of advanced BA students learn about his philosophy. I'll use this space to post questions that the first Enquiry raises (as well as the corresponding discussions in book I of the Treatise) as well as blog my way through some of the issues he explores there.

Re section 1, Of the different species of philosophy. Some questions: 

01 A reasonable being versus an active being: what is the distinction supposed to consist in?

02 Is philosophy that is clear to the ordinary person to be preferred to philosophies that aren't?

03 When Hume says "man," does he mean what we mean when we say "human"?

04 What makes a philosophy racist or sexist? How could one tell if it was either?

Re section 2, Of the origin of ideas. Some questions:

01 What does vividness in a mental operation show?

02 What sense impression corresponds to "minus"? "If"? "Could have been"? (If we say that imagination supplies that, how do we account for the truth value of the resulting proposition--especially in counterfactual cases ("The Rangers could have beaten the Penguins; then they'd be playing the Lightning in Game 7 tonight")?)

More from time to time.

The Somerset case 1772

Re: Somerset v. Stewart, Lofft 1, 98 E.R. 499 (1772).

Some quick readings about conceptions of law at work in the case:

Lawyer Alleyne for Somerset (a slave): slavery is not natural, but "municipal" (conventional); so, slavery cannot cross municipal boundaries (since conventions change from one municipality to another). This seems a perfectly fair conceptual point about the concept of slavery, though it's unclear to me what conception of law is at work; it seems compatible with both conventionalism and pragmatism.

Lawyer Wallace for Stewart (a slave owner): claims there is no law against, and so (given the acceptance of villenage, a sort of share-cropping in feudal times--not nice) there is no case against slavery. This reads pretty straightforwardly as soft conventionalism. 'Soft' because they are prepared to accept the existence of a supporting right even in the absence of positive law.  

Mansfield for the Court: since there is no English positive law on the matter, he reasons that there is no case for holding Somerset in slavery. (Strict conventionalist reasoning.) He considers, but ultimately sets aside, pragmatic considerations about cost and consequence of slavery. He does have a plain fact-y moment where he refers to the law as such.

Conference: Façades: the Architecture of (In)Authenticity

Façades: the Architecture of (In)Authenticity

7th Annual Philosophy and Art Conference (Stony Brook Univ., Manhattan campus)

March 28th-29th 2014

Venue: Bathhouse Studios, 540 E. 11th St, NYC

More information here.

(I'll be a faculty moderator at this conference. ST)

Here's how the organizers describe the conference: 

The façade—the aspect of a building that both looks at, and is seen from, the street—erects a philosophically and artistically productive ambivalence. Depending on the building’s purpose and comportment, the façade may bear little or no resemblance to the structure within. A façade may clearly indicate the purpose of a structure—such as those of government buildings, restaurants, or grocery stores; they may function as merely surface covering—such as the prescribed façades of residential buildings in some historic neighborhoods; or they may be transparent, "invisible," or feigning—such as the façade of a "speak-easy". As a metaphor, the ambivalence erected by the façade seems to extend to numerous aspects of our engagement with the world. Just as the façade both reveals and conceals the depth of the building behind it, so the face we turn towards others both reveals and conceals our feelings, intentions, and character. We invite artists and scholars to the 2014 conference in order to explore the vicissitudes of the Façade—its place, importance, and structure. Is it pernicious or profitable? Is it necessary or elective? Is it universal or an instance of anthropo-centrism? Do the various structures of façades delimit or facilitate expression or identity formation? Other aspects of the main theme to be considered include: public/professional vs. private/personal features of façades; the relation between the façade and the human face; the politics and ethics of façades.

Further questions include (but, of course, are not limited to):

• The Human Face: what does the face allegedly disclose? Is there a parallelism between psychoanalysis and portraiture? What is accomplished by the self-portrait, particularly in the light of Freud's claim that self-analysis is impossible? Consider also: the beautiful/ugly face; the "virtuous/vicious" face; the head (the eyes, the mouth, the hand) in contrast to the face; the (trans)gendered face; the face of the Other.

• Public & Professional Facades: is there something about our public buildings such that their “faces” should be consistent with their interiors? In other words, does the idea of the public bear a particular relationship to truth? Consider also: user profiles (FBook, LinkedIn, etc); chat-room avatars (trolls, noobs, etc); audience reception; documentation (passports, driver’s licenses, Instagram); the public/professional intellectual/artist.

• Private/Personal & Deceptive Façades: how are our homes structured differently vis-à-vis their facades? Must one have a face? Does one have a right not to be seen, i.e. to be "invisible" or to "wear a mask", so to speak? Is there a socio-political advantage or a cost to "wearing a mask," or having a "poker face"? What does the veiled face allegedly conceal (wedding veil; the hijab)? Consider also: the simulacrum and the original; forgery; ownership and intellectual property; commercial branding; pen-names/ pseudonyms; the doppelgänger; the myth of Janus; the uncanny.

• The Facade and Architecture: What does it mean to talk about the "art" of the facade? How can we understand the relation between a building and its face? And how has the function and meaning of this element changed over the course of architectural history, from classical to modern and postmodern paradigms? Moreover, what does it even mean to talk about the facade in terms of architectural authenticity? 

• The Politics of the Façade: How can a facade be a place of resistance or domination, surveillance or invisibility, subjugation or power? How does one encounter a society's culture or power distributions when encountering these facades? How is one to break away from domineering subjugating facades? Can one ever escape? By what means? Is there the ability to resist and how in the face of cultures that produce the same? Are we only left with imagination to break through these barriers? How do memories and nostalgia play in to the impression of a facade?

Dworkin: What is law? 1986 1

Notes on Dworkin's 1986 (Law's empire, Harvard UP).

Dworkin is as big a figure in American legal thought as there is. And this is his Big Book. Let me see if I can figure out what his main (famous) views actually come to, and whether or not I share them.

Start (in chapter 1) with what he calls the plain-fact view: "[t]he law is only a matter of what legal institutions...have decided in the past" (7). I suppose this is the legal realist's view (Holmes and the like), but in a nice move D remarks that the critical legal studies people--about as far left as you can go from the far right (?) realist view--are simply drawing radical conclusions from real law. I have to admit that this is a little opaque to me though. Says D: 

They say that past institutional decisions are not just occasionally but almost always vague or ambiguous or incomplete, and that they are often inconsistent or even incoherent as well. They conclude that there is never really law on any topic or issue, but only rhetoric judges use to dress up decisions actually dictated by ideological or class preference. The career I have described, from the layman's trusting belief that law is everywhere to the cynic's mocking discovery that it is nowhere at all, is the natural course of conviction *10 once we accept the plain-fact view of law and its consequent claim that theoretical disagreement is only disguised politics. (9-10)

Maybe it's just a verbal point, but the claim that the people who think the law is nowhere to be found are real law people sounds odd to me. But I suppose if you take them to be looking for real law, that's enough to make them realists of a sort. Okay.

D clearly is right, though, in his observation that lawyers are often realists in practice, but when asked about the goings-on of tricky cases, become nuanced "theoretical-disagreement" types. You can see him angling to get his own interpretive-type semantic-ish theory started.

D thinks critics might complain that he will misconstrue the legal process if he partitions off all but "lawyers' doctrinal arguments about what the law is" (12). Such a critic (sounds lefty) would worry that focusing so high-level and abstract threatens to "obscure--perhaps they aim to obscure--the important social function of law as ideological force and witness" (12). This of course is foreshadowing, but it is instructive: D will not aim to undress the real law and expose its true sordid character. Instead he will take the law into the abstract space of logic and philosophy of language, and explore it as fundamentally as it will tolerate.